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Abstract
The present research examined the psychological motives underlying widespread support for intelligent design theory
(IDT), a purportedly scientific theory that lacks any scientific evidence; and antagonism toward evolutionary theory (ET), a
theory supported by a large body of scientific evidence. We tested whether these attitudes are influenced by IDT’s provision
of an explanation of life’s origins that better addresses existential concerns than ET. In four studies, existential threat
(induced via reminders of participants’ own mortality) increased acceptance of IDT and/or rejection of ET, regardless of
participants’ religion, religiosity, educational background, or preexisting attitude toward evolution. Effects were reversed by
teaching participants that naturalism can be a source of existential meaning (Study 4), and among natural-science students
for whom ET may already provide existential meaning (Study 5). These reversals suggest that the effect of heightened
mortality awareness on attitudes toward ET and IDT is due to a desire to find greater meaning and purpose in science when
existential threats are activated.
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Introduction
Despite overwhelming evidence for Darwin’s theory of evolution
(ET) and scientific consensus that intelligent design theory (IDT) is
inherently unscientific [1], IDT has received considerable support
from the general public, educators, and elected officials [2,3]. Many
schools include IDT in science curricula; 25% of U.S. high-school
biology teachers devote at least some class time to the topic, and
nearly half of those view IDT as a ‘‘valid scientific alternative to
Darwinian explanations for the origin of species’’ [4]. Although a
Dover, PA, court ruled in 2005 that schools could not include IDT
in Pennsylvania science curricula, the debate is far from over. In
2008, Louisiana passed a bill permitting science teachers to use
outside sources—including those supporting IDT—in curricula,
and in 2009 the Texas state education board voted to allow IDT to
be taught alongside ET in science classes.
This debate is not restricted to the U.S.; in 2006 the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (a major
branch of the nation’s federal research funding agency) refused to
fund research examining the (presumably negative) effects of
IDT’s notoriety, on the grounds that there was not ‘‘adequate
justification for the assumption …that the theory of Evolution, and
not Intelligent Design, was correct’’ [5]. In 2009 the province of
Alberta passed a law that may allow parents to remove children
from courses covering evolution [6]. Given this international
climate of continuing support for IDT and doubt about ET,
despite IDT’s lack of scientific credibility and the large body of
scientific evidence supporting ET, it is likely that psychological
motives, beyond logic and reasoning, underlie the willingness of
educated individuals such as teachers and school board members
to question ET and accept IDT as a viable alternative.
Indeed, psychological motives, which often operate implicitly,
can shape sociopolitical beliefs and ideologies. A comprehensive
meta-analysis found that political conservatism is at least partly
rooted in the basic need to manage feelings of threat and
uncertainty [7]. Specifically, conservative attitudes relate positively
to death anxiety, intolerance of ambiguity, and low self-esteem.
Other research shows that increasing existential anxiety by
reminding people of their own mortality influences attitudes
toward hypothetical political candidates [8], actual political
figures, and foreign-policy strategies [9,10]. Thus, although
dispositional political and religious ideologies may be central
factors underlying the success of the IDT movement and
corresponding doubt about ET, fundamental psychological
motives, such as the need to maintain psychological security, are
also likely to influence these beliefs when activated. (Cognitive
processes also play a role in shaping these views; studies have
shown that young children, and adults with Alzheimer’s who
cannot remember learned knowledge about the origins of objects,
tend to show a preference for teleological and other essentialist
explanations for the origins of objects and organic phenomena
[11,12].).
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stemming from individuals’ awareness of their own mortality
might be a cause of the widespread support for IDT and
corresponding skepticism of ET seen among a wide range of
individuals in North America. We tested the hypothesis that
heightened mortality awareness would lead individuals to embrace
IDT and reject ET; in other words, that shifting one’s opinion on
these theories is a ‘‘terror management’’ strategy—stimulated by
the basic need to maintain psychological security [13].
Terror Management and Acceptance of Intelligent
Design versus Evolution
According to terror management theory (TMT) and findings,
humans’ awareness of their mortality has the potential to produce
debilitating anxiety, so individuals tend to respond to life’s
frequent mortality reminders by employing psychological mech-
anisms that inhibit death-related thoughts [13]. These include
enthusiastic adherence to meaningful conceptions of reality (i.e.,
‘‘worldviews’’), such as religious and political belief systems.
Worldviews may promote a sense of immortality—buffering
existential anxiety—by construing the universe as an orderly,
comprehensible, predictable, and meaningful place where death
can be literally or symbolically transcended. For example, a sense
of literal immortality may be provided by religious belief in an
afterlife [14,15], and a sense of symbolic immortality may be
provided by ‘‘living on’’ through one’s accomplishments, offspring,
or cultural affiliations [16].
IDT may be one such equanimity-providing worldview, albeit a
slightly unusual one. IDT proposes that naturalistic accounts are
insufficient to explain complex organic phenomena and that
therefore an intelligent and presumably supernatural ‘‘designer’’ is
responsible for the origin of all life [17]. IDT may calm existential
concerns through the implications of its assertion that human life
was intentionally created, rather than resulting from seemingly
random and meaningless forces of nature (i.e., natural selection).
This may allow for symbolic immortality—taking comfort in
something larger and more significant than one’s own brief life—
via the understanding there is a purpose to the human enterprise.
Furthermore, whereas many mollifying religious and ideological
worldviews have little appearance of being evidence-based or
rationally derived, IDT is presented as a scientific theory, and was
proposed and developed by scientists at major academic
institutions [17,18]. This may make IDT existentially appealing
in a broader way than most worldviews, which tend to be adhered
to in response to existential threat only by dispositional devotees
[19]. By couching their theory in explicitly scientific terms, IDT’s
authors have made the theory amenable to educated individuals
with some level of basic scientific knowledge, who may be hesitant
to adopt explicitly religious resolutions to existential concerns. For
the average educated American, it may be difficult to embrace a
Biblical view of the world and simultaneously maintain a feeling of
belongingness in the broader culture of Western science-educated
individuals. Because IDT superficially appears consistent with
both the scientific and religious worldviews, a wide range of
individuals (e.g., science teachers, university students, religious
believers) may feel they can support IDT and maintain allegiance
to their science-educated and/or religious communities. (Some
literal immortality may be inferred from IDT as well, based on the
assumption—never directly stated by the theory’s proponents—
that a universe with a supernatural creator might allow for life
after death.).
In contrast, on its face, ET does not confer any sense of greater
meaning or purpose, instead asserting that human life is the result
of the same natural forces that produce viruses and cockroaches.
Although scientists may find meaning and purpose from the notion
that all life is connected by virtue of resulting from the same
explicable biological forces, for the average non-scientist ET may
seem existentially bleak. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins
noted such responses among readers of his books on evolution: ‘‘A
foreign publisher of my first book confessed that he could not sleep
for three nights after reading it, so troubled was he by what he saw
as its cold, bleak message. Others have asked me how I can bear to
get up in the mornings. A teacher from a distant country wrote to
me reproachfully that a pupil had come to him in tears after
reading the same book, because it had persuaded her that life was
empty and purposeless. He advised her not to show the book to
any of her friends, for fear of contaminating them with the same
nihilistic pessimism’’ [20].) Consequently, existential concerns may
lead many individuals to question ET, particularly if IDT is an
available option. Indeed, experimental reminders of one’s
mortality, known to induce a state of ‘‘mortality salience’’ (MS),
have been found to reduce liking of essays which, consistent with
ET, emphasize humans’ animal nature. Similarly, priming
individuals with reminders of their biological similarity to animals
increases death-thought accessibility, as does reading about ET,
among Creationists [21–23]. More broadly, the stronger individ-
uals’ belief in evolution, the less likely they are to believe in the
‘‘soul’’ or afterlife, suggesting that acceptance of ET may be
untenable for those who have taken a more spiritual approach to
finding meaning in life, and vice-versa [24]. Thus, ET may be a
conceptual obstacle to a search for greater meaning in life, so
rejecting or denying ET’s veracity may be a means of regulating
existential anxiety.
However, based on TMT, existential anxieties might also be
expected to promote acceptance of ET in certain individuals—
those who are already particularly well versed in the theory.
Mortality salience (MS) typically motivates more fervent support of
accepted worldviews [13], so science-educated individuals, and
natural-science students in particular, might respond to MS by
staunchly supporting ET, given that, in the Western scientific
worldview, ET is the most widely and empirically accepted
explanation for the diversity of life on Earth, and the origin of the
human species. At the very least, science-educated individuals—
such as the undergraduate psychology students who constitute
most psychology research samples—may find themselves unable to
reject ET as a way of assuaging existential anxiety, given the
importance of ET to their psychology-student worldview. These
individuals may nonetheless embrace IDT in such circumstances,
given the theory’s scientific veneer, but they may fail to see its
logical incompatibility with ET—an incompatibility that is at
times downplayed by IDT proponents [25]—and avoid shifting
their views on the more standard scientific doctrine. Thus, while
we expected most individuals to respond to MS by espousing a
stronger belief in IDT and weaker belief in ET, we expected
university-educated psychology students to respond by embracing
IDT, but not necessarily changing their views of ET.
The Present Research
In five studies we manipulated mortality salience (MS), then
presented participants with a passage arguing for ET and/or a
passage arguing for IDT, then assessed their views toward the
author of each passage and the corresponding theory. Study 1
used a sample of psychology-student undergraduates at largely
liberal universities. Given the importance of evolution to
psychology students’ worldview, we did not expect them to
substantially shift their views of ET, but rather to respond to MS
by demonstrating greater acceptance of IDT. Study 2 used a more
diverse sample of students from across North America; here, we
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ET in response to MS (i.e., an interaction between experimental
condition and views toward each theory). We had the same
predictions for Study 3, which sampled adult Americans
representing a wide range of socioeconomic and educational
backgrounds.
Study 4 again sampled psychology students, but additionally
manipulated whether naturalism (the scientific perspective under-
lying ET, but not IDT) was depicted as a source of existential
meaning and purpose. This allowed us to examine whether the
motive to embrace a scientific theory that provides a sense of
greater human purpose is the causal mechanism underlying belief
in IDT and/or aversion toward ET in response to existential
threat. We predicted that this meaning-in-naturalism manipula-
tion would moderate the effect of MS on views of IDT and ET,
such that participants who read the passage depicting naturalism
as a source of meaning would not respond to MS by espousing
greater support for IDT and/or weaker support for ET. Our
focus, here, on the importance of seeking greater meaning and
purpose in human life as a way of coping with existential dread, is
consistent with research demonstrating humans’ basic need to
maintain a sense of meaning [26]. However, this is one of the first
studies to manipulate the meaningfulness of a potential terror-
management mechanism (but see [27]), to test whether this
fundamental motivation accounts for effects. Study 5 addressed
the same issue in a different way; participants were university-level
natural-science students, for whom naturalism is already a source
of greater meaning. Given these participants’ belief system, we
expected them to respond to MS with greater support for ET, the
theory that provides them with meaning and identity, and greater
antagonism toward IDT, which they should recognize as
scientifically invalid and inconsistent with their central worldview.
In all studies, we tested whether effects were due to Christianity
or other religious beliefs. It has been assumed that public support
for IDT results from a Christian desire to reinstate Creationism
[28]. Furthermore, studies have shown that MS promotes
increased belief in supernatural beings and the afterlife among
religious individuals [15,29], and that religiosity protects against
existential threat [14]. However, IDT is not explicitly religious,
makes no promise of an afterlife, and reads more like a scientific
theory than a religious one. Thus, IDT may provide existential
benefits without heightening religious belief, and it may do so even
in non-religious individuals—which would have major implica-
tions for the scientific views of individuals who either do not have
strong religious convictions or would like to reconcile their
religious beliefs with their science education.
Ethics statement
For all studies in the present research, behavioral research ethics
board approval was obtained from the University of British
Columbia or Union College, and all subjects provided written
informed consent (for participants who completed the study via the
internet, consent was provided by clicking a designated button on-
line; this was approved by the UBC Behavioral Research Ethics
Board).
Methods
Study 1
122 undergraduate psychology students (72% women) at Union
College (n=53) or the University of British Columbia (n=69) were
randomly assigned to write about the thoughts and feelings
aroused by imagining either their own death (MS condition) or
dental pain, a typical control manipulation used in TMT research
to ensure that effects attributed to MS are not in fact due to
general negative affect or arousal [13]. Participants then
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
[30]), before reading a passage arguing for ET, ‘‘written by
Professor Richard Dawkins, a famous evolutionary theorist,’’ and
a passage arguing for IDT, ‘‘written by Professor Michael Behe, a
famous scientist who argues for the theory of intelligent design.’’
These 174-word similarly styled passages were excerpted from the
authors [17,18,31] (see Text S1). Neither referred to religion or
belief; instead, both read as descriptions of, and empirical support
for, a scientific theory. Thus, if participants responded to MS by
accepting IDT, this could not be attributed to a desire to embrace
religion per se.
Each passage was followed by a 6-item scale assessing
participants’ views about the author’s expertise and their belief
in the theory referred to in the passage (based on [32]).
Specifically, participants rated each author, using a 9-point scale,
on intelligence, knowledge, agreement with his views, and truth of
his opinion. They then rated their agreement with two statements,
on a 5-point scale: ‘‘Evolutionary [Intelligent design] theory is a
solid theory supported by a great deal of evidence’’ and
‘‘Evolutionary [Intelligent design] theory is the best explanation
we have of life’s origins.’’ (It is noteworthy that although
evolutionary theory addresses questions about the origin of life
for each species, not the origin of life from non-life, it is very
commonly presented in this way, and, in fact, the term ‘‘origin’’
can connote either ancestry or inception of life. However, in case
this wording might have affected results, we re-analyzed the main
effects and interactions in all studies excluding this item, and found
that all effects held when scales were based on the remaining 5
items; one minor exception was in Study 5, where the interaction
was significant only at the one-tailed level, p=.05, and the main
effect of MS on Behe-IDT was no longer significant, p=.12.
Interested readers should contact the authors for more information
on these subsidiary analyses.)
The resulting 6-item scales, computed using standard scores
were reliable based on Cronbach’s as; these were .84 for Behe-
IDT and .85 for Dawkins-ET. The scaling of these 12 items was
also supported by a varimax-rotated factor analysis, showing that
all item loadings ranged from .62–.82 on predicted primary
factors, and below .32 on secondary factors. A scree test also
suggested a two-factor solution (eigenvalues for the first five
components were 4.75, 3.05, 1.23, 0.68, and 0.49). When the
factors were allowed to correlate, using a direct oblimin rotation,
they were found to be independent, r=.00.) Because standard
scores were used (here, and in all five studies), means on the two
scales (Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT) cannot be directly compared
to each other (both are 0 when standard scores are used).
However, to ensure that actual mean responses on these scales
were not at floor or ceiling, we also computed scores for each
participant by summing across the 6 items on each scale. In no
study was the overall mean of these summed scores near ceiling or
floor; see Text S2 for greater detail. Order of the passages and
scales was counterbalanced; no order effects emerged. It is
noteworthy that 4 of these items ask about views of the two
authors, rather than directly assessing views of the relevant
theories. Although views of the authors are likely to reflect and
influence views of their respective theories [33], we wanted to
ensure that results are not due to an effect of mortality salience on
attitudes toward these two authors but not the theories, so we also
ran all analyses using 2-item scales comprising only the last two
items, which asked about views toward the theories but not the
authors. In all studies, we separately report results for these 2-item
scales, after results for the full 6-item scales.
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ranging from 1 (‘‘not at all’’) to 10 (‘‘extremely’’), completed a
measure of intrinsic (Cronbach’s a=.72) and extrinsic (Cron-
bach’s a=.79) religiosity [34], and reported the following religious
affiliations: Buddhist (13%), Catholic (22%), Christian/Christian
Orthodox (15%), Hindu (8%), Jewish (2%), Muslim (3%),
Protestant (8%), Spiritual (10%), and none of these (19%).
Study 2
352 undergraduates (40% women) from 179 universities in 45
U.S. states or Canadian provinces were recruited through an
online survey research company (66%; n=232) or in a class at the
University of British Columbia (24%; n=83) or Union College
(10%; n=37). They followed the same procedure as in Study 1,
except that they did not complete the measure of intrinsic/
extrinsic religiosity, given an absence of meaningful differences
between these measures and the single-item religiosity measure
(which was included here) in Study 1. Order of the passages and
scales was again counterbalanced; no order effects emerged. Scale
scores for Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT, based on standard scores,
were reliable; Cronbach’s as=.89 and .91, respectively. Partici-
pants reported the following religious affiliations: Buddhist (3%),
Catholic (22%), Christian (25%), Christian Orthodox (2%), Hindu
(1%), Jewish (4%), Muslim (2%), Protestant (7%), Sikh (1%),
Spiritual (11%), none of these (21%), and Other (1%).
Study 3
832 individuals (55% women), ranging in age from 18–75 years
(Median=37), living in the U.S., were recruited through an online
survey research company. They followed the same procedure as in
Study 2, except that they viewed only one excerpt (arguing for
either IDT or ET, as described below), and reported education
level, income bracket, social class, and field of work. Religious
affiliations were as follows: Buddhist (1%) Catholic (20%),
Christian (32%), Christian Orthodox (1%), Hindu (1%), Jewish
(3%), Protestant (14%), Spiritual (10%), none of these (12%), and
Other (6%). Participants were also diverse in education and
socioeconomic status: 3% reported attending ‘‘some high school,’’
23% had only a high-school diploma, 33% attended ‘‘some
college,’’ 32% had a college degree, and 9% had a post-graduate
degree; 24% identified as ‘‘working class,’’ 19% ‘‘lower-middle
class,’’ 44% ‘‘middle class,’’ 12% ‘‘upper-middle class,’’ and less
than 1% ‘‘upper class.’’ Consistent with these ratings, 12%
reported an annual income of under $20,000, 25% of $20,001–
40,000, 20% of $40,001–60,000, 11% of $60,001–80,000, 8% of
$80,001–100,000, and 9% of over $100,000 (15% did not report
income).
To control for the possibility of stylistic differences in the
excerpts describing IDT and ET influencing results, in Study 3 we
changed the excerpts used in Studies 1 and 2, so that the two
passages were made to be identical except that one referred to
IDT and the other to ET. We did this by combining statements
from each of the two passages, actually written by Dawkins and
Behe; in the IDT condition, Dawkins’ statements were changed to
refer to IDT (and presented to participants as if written by Behe),
and, in the ET condition, Behe’s statements were changed to refer
to ET (and presented to participants as if written by Dawkins); see
Text S3. Participants were told that passages were written by
‘‘Professor Dawkins, a famous evolutionary theorist’’ (ET
condition), or ‘‘Professor Behe, a famous scientist who argues for
intelligent design’’ (IDT condition). These sentences were followed
by a definition of evolution, as ‘‘the natural process of change in
inherited traits from generation to generation by mutation, natural
selection, and genetic drift’’ (ET condition), or intelligent design, as
‘‘the belief that physical and biological systems observed in the
universe result from purposeful design by an intelligent being
rather than from chance or undirected natural processes’’ (IDT
condition). These definitions were added to ensure that partici-
pants were at least familiar with the basic idea behind the theory
they were reading about. Author-theory was manipulated between
subjects, because the artificiality of the almost-identical passages
would be obvious to participants if they read both. We again
computed an author-theory scale using standard scores, which
represented participants’ agreement with Dawkins and belief in
ET (ET condition; Cronbach’s a=.95) or agreement with Behe
and belief in IDT (IDT condition; Cronbach’s a=.93).
Study 4
269 UBC psychology students (77% women) followed the same
procedure as Study 2, except that after receiving the MS or control
induction, half viewed a passage excerpted from Sagan ([35]; see
Text S4). They were instructed to ‘‘read the paragraph below,
written by Dr. Carl Sagan, one of the world’s most famous
scientists.’’ They were told that they would later be quizzed on
their understanding of the paragraph, to ensure they read the
passage carefully and thought about its meaning. All participants
then completed the PANAS, then read either the Behe-IDT or the
Dawkins-ET passage used in Studies 1 and 2, followed by the same
assessment items (here all measured with a 7-point response scale;
Cronbach’s as, based on standard scores, were .86, Dawkins-ET,
and .86, Behe-IDT).
A subset of 104 participants (80% women), roughly equally
distributed across the 8 cells, participated in a follow-up study 4–6
months later, in which they completed a measure of evolution
acceptance ([24]; Cronbach’s a=.85), our single-item religiosity
measure, intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (Cronbach’s as=.80
and .82), and a measure of religious fundamentalism ([36];
Cronbach’s a=.85). Intrinsic religiosity was scored omitting 2
items with negative item-total correlations, which, when included,
lowered the Cronbach’s a to .51. No results changed using the full
scale instead. These follow-up data were collected because we
expected that participants’ responses 4–6 months after the
experiment could not be attributed to any effects of the
experiment, so by testing whether these scores moderate effects,
we can further probe whether shifting views toward ET/IDT in
response to MS is a strategy utilized only by individuals with
certain religious or evolution beliefs.
Study 5
99 UBC undergraduate and graduate students (50% women)
were recruited from natural-science courses and the natural-
science library to follow the same procedure as in Study 2.
Participants reported the number of university-level biology,
physics, and chemistry courses they had taken; range=2–55,
Median=11. Order of passages and scales was counterbalanced; no
order effects emerged. Standardized scale scores were reliable;
Cronbach’s as=.88 (Dawkins-ET) and .90 (Behe-IDT). Reported
religious affiliations were: Buddhist (3%), Catholic (22%),
Christian (16%), Christian Orthodox (2%), Hindu (2%), Jewish
(5%), Protestant (6%), Spiritual (8%), none of these (17%), and
Other (3%).
Results and Discussion
Study 1
A mixed-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed no
interaction between the within-subjects factor of author-theory
(Behe-IDT vs. Dawkins-ET) and the between-subjects MS mani-
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different responses toward the two theories and authors. However,
a predicted main effect of MS emerged on the Behe-IDT scale,
indicating that MS led to more positive views of Behe and IDT
compared to control, t(119)=2.18, Cohen’s d=.40, p,.05 (see
Figure 1). This effect held when the two-item scale based on views
of IDT was used instead, t(119)=1.72, p,.05 one-tailed. No
difference emerged for the Dawkins-ET scale.
Religiosity was related positively to Behe-IDT, r=.25, and
negatively to Dawkins-ET, r=2.30, both ps,.05, suggesting that
more religious individuals tend to support IDT and dislike ET.
Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity showed a similar pattern; rs=.28
and 2.34 (intrinsic), and .20, 2.17 (p=.07; extrinsic), on Behe-
IDT and Dawkins-ET respectively; ps,.05 except as noted.
However, none of the religiosity measures were influenced by MS,
t(116)=0.63, and ts(118)=1.38 and 0.52, for the single-item scale,
intrinsic, and extrinsic religiosity, respectively, all ns, suggesting
that the effect of MS on views of Behe-IDT was not due to any
change in religious belief. Indeed, the effect of MS on Behe-IDT
held controlling for religiosity, F(1, 115)=5.49 (based on the
single-item measure of religiosity), and F(1, 116)=7.19 (based on
the intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity scales), ps,.05. Perhaps most
important, religiosity did not moderate the effect of MS on Behe-
IDT, bs=2.09, 2.06, and 2.06 for the single-item, intrinsic, and
extrinsic religiosity scales, all ns; nor was there an interaction
between religiosity and MS on Dawkins-ET, bs=2.11, 2.04, and
.01 for the three scales, all ns (these last analyses were conducted
using multiple regression, rather than ANOVA, because the
religiosity variable used in the interaction was continuous). In all
studies, except where noted, p values for null findings on religiosity,
religion, and Christianity as moderators were greater than .10;
none of these were marginally significant.
We also tested whether type of religion moderated the effect of
MS. Participants were classified as Christian (i.e., Christians,
Christian-Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant) or not Christian
(i.e., Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Spiritual, and
‘‘None’’). Christians were expected to be most supportive of
IDT, given conceptual links between IDT and Creationism, so if
IDT is a security-providing worldview that works in the same
manner as religious ideologies, Christians should be most likely to
embrace IDT in response to MS. Expected main effects of
Christianity emerged on both Behe-IDT, F(1, 111)=7.93, and
Dawkins-ET, F(1, 111)=7.54, ps,.05, indicating that Christians
showed greater positivity than non-Christians toward Behe-IDT,
and greater negativity toward Dawkins-ET. However, there was
no interaction between Christianity and MS on either Behe-IDT
or Dawkins-ET, Fs(1, 111)=0.21 and 1.17, both ns, indicating that
MS did not have a stronger effect on these views among
Christians. These results held when Catholics were classified as
non-Christians rather than Christians, and this was the case in all
studies.
Finally, MS had no effect on negative mood, t(119)=1.43, ns;
but slightly increased positive mood, t(119)=2.00, p,.05,
consistent with previous research [37]. Indeed, MS manipulations
tend to have little impact on explicit affect, but effects emerge
occasionally, as was the case in Studies 1 and 3 here. However,
entering positive affect and negative affect as covariates in all five
studies did not alter any results.
Thus, belief in IDT may, in part, be a normative response to
heightened death awareness. However, the sample included in
Study 1 was highly homogenous; it remains unclear whether
students of more varied science backgrounds, better representing
the educated public who support IDT, would respond similarly.
Study 2 was designed to address this issue.
Figure 1. Effects of mortality salience (MS) on liking of Behe and belief in intelligent design theory (IDT), and liking of Dawkins and
belief in evolutionary theory (ET), Study 1. Note. Values are based on standard scores; means for each scale were computed by standardizing
each of the six author-theory items that the scale comprised, around their common mean, and taking the mean of the resulting z-scores. Because the
two scales were centered around different means, values on the two scales (Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT) cannot be directly compared to each other.
Based on a t-test, the difference between the control and MS conditions on Behe-IDT was significant, p,.05. Error bars represent the standard error of
the mean. *p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017349.g001
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A 2 (Behe-IDT vs. Dawkins-ET)62 (MS vs. control) mixed-
measures ANOVA on the author-theory scales revealed an
interaction between the within-subjects factor of author-theory
and the between-subjects factor of MS condition, F(1, 350)=4.21,
p,.05, indicating that MS led to opposite responses to the two
authors and theories: relatively greater positivity toward Behe-IDT
[though not significantly greater than control, t(350)=1.07, ns],
but significantly greater negativity toward Dawkins-ET,
t(350)=2.30, Cohen’s d=.24, p,.05 (see Figure 2). The
interaction and main effect on ET both held when using the
two-item scale of views toward ET and IDT, F(1, 349)=4.28, and
t(350)=2.09, both ps,.05, suggesting that these results are not due
to MS affecting views of the authors without also affecting views of
the relevant theories.
Religiosity again related positively to views of Behe-IDT, r=.39,
and negatively to Dawkins-ET, r=2.34, both ps,.05. MS had no
effect on religiosity, t(339)=0.43, ns, and the effect of MS on
Dawkins-ET held controlling for religiosity, F(1, 338)=3.81,
p=.05, as did the interaction, F(1, 338)=2.54, p=.06. As in Study
1, there was no interaction between religiosity and MS on
Dawkins-ET, b=2.01, nor on Behe-IDT, b=2.01, both ns.
Again classifying participants as Christian or non-Christian, a two-
way interaction emerged between Christianity and author-theory,
F(1, 348)=60.54, p,.05, indicating that Christians preferred
Behe-IDT, F(1, 188)=25.77, p,.05, but non-Christians preferred
Dawkins-ET, F(1, 162)=39.58, p,.05. However, Christianity did
not moderate the interaction between MS and author-theory,
F(1, 348)=0.29, nor the effectof MS on Behe-IDT, F(1, 348)=0.05,
or Dawkins-ET, F(1, 348)=1.38, all ns, indicating that decreased
support for ET in response to MS was not driven by Christians.
In general, the findings of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1.
Across studies, MS influenced participants’ views of ET and IDT;
in Study 1 this emerged as greater support for IDT, and in Study 2
as greater antagonism toward ET. This difference between studies
may be due to a lower baseline belief in ET in the more diverse
Study 2 sample, or to reluctance among Study 1’s psychology
student participants to question ET while participating in scientific
research. Nonetheless, the studies converge to suggest that
university educated individuals’ views of IDT and ET can be
influenced by existential threat.
However, both studies were restricted to student populations,
leaving it unclear whether widespread support for IDT and
skepticism toward ET seen among post-collegiate Americans can
be attributed to terror management processes. Similarly, we do
not know whether individuals who have not attended college
would respond similarly. Individuals who do not subscribe to the
scientific cultural worldview may be less likely to implicitly use
their beliefs about scientific (or seemingly scientific) theories as a
way of managing existential threat. Thus, to the extent that the
results of Studies 1 and 2 were due to the scientific framing of
IDT and ET, they may not generalize to less educated
individuals.
In addition, to retain ecological validity, both Studies 1 and 2
manipulated ET and IDT using statements written by two
prominent authors, thus examining how MS influences views of
these theories as they are actually encountered by the average
science student, teacher, or other well-read individual. However,
as a consequence of this design, it remains possible that the
differences found were due not to the relative merits of the
theories, but rather to something unique about the writing of the
two passages. Study 3 was designed to address these issues.
Figure 2. Effects of MS on liking of Behe and belief in IDT, and liking of Dawkins and belief in ET, Study 2. Note. Values are based on
standard scores; means for each scale were computed by standardizing each of the six author-theory items that the scale comprised, around their
common mean, and taking the mean of the resulting z-scores. Because the two scales were centered around different means, values on the two
scales (Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT) cannot be directly compared to each other. The overall interaction, which emerged from a mixed-measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA), and the difference between the control and MS conditions on Dawkins-ET, based on a t-test, was significant, p,.05. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean. *p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017349.g002
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A 2 (MS vs. control)62 (Behe-IDT vs. Dawkins-ET) between-
subjects ANOVA revealed an interaction between author-theory
and MS, F(1, 828)=7.71, p,.05, replicating Study 2 and
indicating that MS led to opposite responses to the two theories:
relatively greater positivity toward Behe-IDT [though not
significantly different from control, t(402)=0.81, ns], and signif-
icantly greater negativity toward Dawkins-ET, t(426)=2.99,
Cohen’s d=.30, p,.05 (see Figure 3). The interaction and main
effect on ET held using the two-item scales assessing views of the
theories only, F(1, 828)=4.86, and t(426)=2.38, both ps,.05,
again suggesting that results are not due to MS affecting views of
the authors without also affecting views of the corresponding
theories.
Religiosity again related positively to views of Behe-IDT and
negatively to Dawkins-ET, rs=.21 and 2.52, respectively, ps,.05.
MS did not affect religiosity, t(828)=0.72, ns, and the interaction
between MS and author-theory held controlling for religiosity,
F(1, 825)=7.36, p,.05, as did the main effect on Dawkins-ET,
F(1, 423)=8.29, p,.05. Neither religiosity, b=.04, nor Christian-
ity, F(1, 824)=0.89, moderated the interaction, nor the main effect
on Dawkins-ET, b=.01 for religiosity, and F(1, 424)=0.25 for
Christianity, all ns; there also were no interactions between these
variables and MS on Behe-IDT, b=2.04, for religiosity, and
F(1, 400)=0.75 for Christianity, both ns.
To examine whether participants’ educational background—a
rough indicator of their subscription to the scientific worldview—
moderated effects, we first converted education to a dichotomous
variable based on a median split (college graduates vs. ‘‘some
college’’ or less). There was no three-way interaction between
education, MS, and author-theory, F(1, 821)=0.13, nor was there
an interaction using the full categorical education variable,
F(5, 802)=0.23, nor when treating education as continuous,
b=.00, all ns. Education also did not moderate the effect of MS on
Dawkins-ET, F(1, 421)=0.03 (dichotomous variable), F(5, 412)
=0.29 (categorical), and b=.02 (continuous); nor did interactions
emerge on Behe-IDT, F(1, 400)=0.57 (dichotomous), F(6, 390)
=0.86 (categorical), and b=.02 (continuous); all ns. Controlling for
education, the interaction between author-theory and MS held, F(1,
824)=7.63, p,.05, as did the main effect of MS on Dawkins-ET,
F(1, 422)=8.75; ps,.05.
These findings suggest that the present results are not driven by
individuals with a strong educational background, but rather seem
to represent a terror management strategy used regardless of
education. This is informative for the distinction that emerged
between Studies 1 and 2, regarding whether participants were
more likely to support IDT or disavow ET in response to MS.
Given that the specific effects of Study 3 mirrored those of Study 2,
and in both studies participants were not drawn from a population
of psychology students participating in research for psychological
course credit (as they were in Study 1), these findings support our
interpretation of the difference between studies as related to
individuals’ longstanding beliefs about ET. Individuals who are
not necessarily psychology students, may or may not have strong
educational backgrounds, and tend to hold weaker pro-ET views
than do psychology students, appear more willing to shift their
views of ET in response to MS, compared with psychology
students participating in psychological research as part of a course
requirement. Supporting this interpretation, the highly diverse
Study 3 sample showed greater control-condition positivity toward
IDT and negativity toward ET than did the less diverse Study 1
and 2 samples; examining the four items that directly addressed
views of IDT and ET (i.e., asking whether each is the ‘‘best
explanation we have of species’ origins’’ and a ‘‘solid theory
Figure 3. Effects of MS on liking of Behe and belief in IDT, and liking of Dawkins and belief in ET, Study 3. Note. Values are based on
standard scores; means for each scale were computed by standardizing each of the six author-theory items that the scale comprised, around their
common mean, and taking the mean of the resulting z-scores. Because the two scales were centered around different means, values on the two
scales (Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT) cannot be directly compared to each other. The overall interaction, which emerged from a between-subjects
ANOVA, and the difference between the control and MS conditions, based on a t-test on Dawkins-ET, were significant, p,.05. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean. *p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017349.g003
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IDT and pro-ET Ms in Study 3=2.97 and 3.11, compared to
Study 1 Ms=2.38 and 3.68, between-samples t(252)=3.73, and
t(268)=3.13, ps,.05; and compared to Study 2 Ms=2.57 and
3.70, between-samples t(365)=5.04 and t(382)=4.59, ps,.05
(Study 3 scores were transformed from a 7-point to a 5-point
scale to make these comparisons).
Together, these studies suggest that individuals ranging in age
from late adolescence to late adulthood, from a diverse range of
socioeconomic, regional, and educational backgrounds, tend to
respond to MS with increased support for IDT or decreased
support for ET. Despite the superficial differences between these
responses, at an underlying conceptual level they are coherent;
participants respond to existential concerns by increasing their
relative preference for an apparently ‘‘scientific’’ theory (i.e., IDT)
that can provide a sense of meaning and purpose to the human
endeavor, and/or decreasing their support for the theory that fails
to do so.
However, the results thus far do not tell us whether these effects
were, as we surmise, due to an activated search for greater
meaning and purpose in response to existential threat. Given the
consistent pattern of results—across studies, participants respond-
ed by rejecting the scientific theory suggesting that human life is
meaningless and/or embraced the theory suggesting life is
meaningful—this seems likely. However, few previous studies
have established a motivational causal process (beyond avoidance
of death-related anxiety) underlying the effects of MS. In one
relevant study a motivation to increase feelings of control was
found to account for MS effects [38], but that motive is unlikely to
account for the present results because both ET and IDT depict
humans as at the mercy of external forces (i.e., low in control).
Thus, to increase our understanding of why views of IDT/ET are
influenced by existential threat, Study 4 examined whether a
search for greater meaning might account for effects.
In addition, one limitation of Studies 1–3 is that religious belief
was assessed only during the experimental session, and stable
attitudes about evolution could not be assessed separately from the
dependent variable, so we had no baseline measure of religion or
attitudes toward ET. Furthermore, the religious disposition that
might be expected to most strongly influence views of IDT and
ET, religious fundamentalism, was not assessed. Thus, Study 4
included a follow-up assessment, in which we measured religious
(including fundamentalism) and evolution beliefs several months
after the experiment, on a subset of the sample.
Study 4
If participants in Studies 1–3 responded to MS by evidencing
discomfort with ET, a scientific theory that may be taken to
indicate the meaninglessness of human existence, or embracing
IDT, a seemingly scientific theory that may be taken to indicate
greater meaning in human life, because existential concerns
promote the acceptance of seemingly scientific theories that
provide such meaning and the rejection of those that do not, then
framing ET as having the potential to provide meaning and
purpose should remove or reverse these effects. Under such
conditions, psychology students should not need to embrace IDT
in the face of existential threat, as they did in Study 1, because the
more normative theory associated with their scientific worldview
would no longer be inconsistent with the need to find greater
meaning.
We tested this account in Study 4 by assigning half the
participants to read an excerpted passage by cosmologist and
science writer Carl Sagan arguing that humans can attain meaning
and purpose by seeking to understand the natural origins of life
[35]. In this passage, Sagan explicitly states that even if humans
are ‘‘merely matter,’’ we still can find purpose, but it must be one
that we work out for ourselves. The passage articulates a way in
which greater meaning can be found from embracing naturalism,
so if the findings from Studies 1–3 were due to the apparent
absence of such meaning in ET compared to IDT, reading this
passage should weaken or reverse those effects.
Main study. A 2 (Sagan vs. no-Sagan)62 (MS vs. control)62
(Dawkins-ET vs. Behe-IDT) between-subjects ANOVA revealed
the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 257)=6.96, p,.05 (see
Figure 4); this interaction held when the two-item scales reflecting
views of ET/IDT only were used instead, F(1, 257)=6.07, p,.05.
To interpret this three-way interaction, we conducted two 2 (MS
vs. control)62 (Dawkins-ET vs. Behe-IDT) between-subjects
ANOVAs, separately for participants in the Sagan and no-Sagan
conditions. In the no-Sagan condition, the two-way interaction
was not significant, F(1, 126)=1.26, ns, but, as in Study 1,
participants trended toward increased positivity toward Behe-IDT
in response to MS, though here the difference from control did not
reach significance, t(61)=1.38, p=.17. In contrast, in the Sagan
condition, a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 131)=7.44,
p,.05, revealed the reverse pattern: when participants read
Sagan’s passage suggesting that naturalism can be a source of
meaning, they responded to MS with significantly decreased
positivity toward Behe-IDT, t(64)=2.58, Cohen’s d=.64, p,.05,
and relatively increased positivity toward Dawkins-ET, though not
significantly different from control, t(67)=1.45, p=.15. This
represents a full reversal of the effect found in Study 1, where
MS led to significantly increased positivity toward Behe-IDT
compared to control. Both the MS6author interaction, and the
main effect on Behe-IDT, in the Sagan condition, held when using
the two-item scales reflecting views of ET and IDT only, F(1, 131)
=2.69, and t(64)=2.86, p,.05.
Religiosity was again correlated with Behe-IDT and Dawkins-
ET, rs=.19 and 2.30, both ps,.05, and a two-way interaction
between Christianity and author-theory, F(1, 249)=20.76, p,.05,
indicated that Christians showed no preference between Behe-
IDT and Dawkins-ET, whereas non-Christians tended to prefer
Dawkins-ET [t(98)=1.01, ns, for Christians; and t(163)=8.63, for
non-Christians, p,.05]. MS did not affect religiosity, t(260)=1.05,
ns, and the three-way interaction between Sagan condition, MS,
and author-theory held controlling for religiosity, F(1, 253)=7.12,
as did the interaction between MS and author-theory in the Sagan
condition, F(1, 128)=8.39, and the main effect on Behe-IDT in
this condition, F(1, 62)=6.96; ps,.05. Neither religiosity,
b=2.06, nor Christianity, F(1, 249)=0.04, moderated the
three-way interaction, nor the two-way interaction in the Sagan
condition, b=.04 for religiosity and F(1, 127)=0.02 for
Christianity; all ns. Religiosity also did not moderate the main
effect of MS on Behe-IDT in the Sagan condition, b=.10, ns, but
there was a marginal Christianity6MS interaction on Behe-IDT
in this condition, F(1, 62)=3.39, p=.07, indicating that non-
Christians who read Sagan became more negative toward Behe-
IDT in response to MS than did Christians, although effects were
in the predicted direction for both groups (Ms=20.59 vs. 0.01 for
non-Christians and 20.28 vs. 20.21 for Christians, in MS and
control conditions, respectively). There was no interaction
between religiosity and MS on Dawkins-ET, bs=.14 and .20 in
the Sagan and no-Sagan conditions, nor between Christianity and
MS on Dawkins-ET in either condition, F(1, 65)=1.69 and
F(1, 63)=0.20; all ns.
Follow-up study. The three-way interaction between MS,
Sagan/no Sagan, and author-theory emerged in this sub-sample,
F(1, 92)=8.98, and held controlling for scores on all four measures
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evolution, F(1, 91)=8.74; ps,.05. As in the full sample, a two-
way interaction between MS and author-theory emerged in the
Sagan condition, F(1, 47)=6.20, p,.05. There was also an
interaction in the no-Sagan condition, F(1, 45)=3.18, p,.05 one-
tailed. In both no-Sagan and Sagan conditions, simple effects
Figure 4. Effects of MS on liking of Behe and belief in IDT, and liking of Dawkins and belief in ET, for participants who did not read
Sagan’s excerpt about naturalism (Panel A) and those who did (Panel B), Study 4. Note. Values are based on standard scores; means for
each scale were computed by standardizing each of the six author-theory items that the scale comprised, around their common mean, and taking the
mean of the resulting z-scores. Because the two scales were centered around different means, values on the two scales (Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT)
cannot be directly compared to each other. The overall three-way interaction, based on a between-subjects ANOVA, and, in Panel B, the two-way
interaction and the difference between the control and MS conditions, based on a between-subjects ANOVA and a t-test on Behe-IDT, respectively,
were significant, ps,.05. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. *p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017349.g004
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MS increased positivity in the no-Sagan condition, replicating
Study 1, and decreased positivity in the Sagan condition,
ts(24)=2.09 and 2.24, Cohen’s ds=.88 and .91, respectively,
ps,.05. Both effects held controlling for scores on all four religion
measures and ET acceptance, F(1, 19)=7.24, in the Sagan, and
F(1, 17)=5.60, in no-Sagan condition; ps,.05. As in the main
study, the three-way and two-way interaction in the Sagan
condition, and the main effect on IDT in the Sagan condition, all
held when the two-item scales assessing views of ET/IDT only
were used instead; F(1, 92)=6.44, p,.05; F(1, 47)=4.05, p=.05;
t(24)=2.14, p,.05.
Finally, with only one exception, none of the four measures of
stable religious views or ET acceptance moderated any of the
interactions or main effects in this subsample. The one exception
was an extrinsic religiosity6MS interaction on Behe-IDT in the
no-Sagan condition, b=.54, p,.05, indicating that the effect of
MS on Behe-IDT was weaker among individuals high in extrinsic
religiosity. Given that similar effects did not emerge with any of the
other religion measures, and this particular effect is not easily
interpretable, it is unlikely to be reliable. In sum, the present
results cannot be attributed to stable individual differences in
religious belief, fundamentalism, or views of evolution, and do not
vary depending on these beliefs or views.
Summary and limitations. One potential limitation of this
study is that we did not include a neutral control passage in the no-
Sagan condition, given that even a seemingly neutral passage
might have elicited unexpected priming effects. This resulted in an
approximately 2-minute additional delay following the MS
manipulation in the Sagan condition. However, this delay-length
difference is unlikely to account for effects, because: (a) in Studies 1
and 2, participants read counterbalanced passages by Dawkins and
Behe, and completed each measure immediately after each
passage, yet no order effects emerged despite the varying delay
lengths; and (b) if the additional delay influenced results, previous
research suggests that it would either increase the effect, if the
delay heightened participants’ terror-management response, or
decrease the effect, if the delay allowed terror-management
processes to wane [39]. There is no indication, conceptual or
empirical, that an additional delay would completely reverse effects.
Thus, it is considerably more likely that the strong differences
found between the Sagan and no-Sagan conditions resulted from
the substantive content of the Sagan manipulation.
The findings of Study 4 converge with those of Studies 1, 2, and
3, but add to our conceptual understanding. Specifically, the
finding that reading Sagan’s excerpt moderated the interaction
between MS and attitudes toward ET versus IDT suggests that a
desire to see human life as having greater meaning and purpose
likely underlies our previous effects. Reading the Sagan passage
apparently dissuaded participants from embracing IDT as a way
of managing existential concerns, and in fact made participants
facing existential threat more antagonistic toward IDT, presum-
ably because it threatened the theory that is the true mainstay of
their scientific worldview and that could now be seen as providing
existential meaning. This result is important because it addresses
the process underlying the causal link between MS and scientific
beliefs.
Given these findings, certain individuals who are more deeply
invested in the scientific worldview (e.g., scientists) may embrace
ET in response to existential threat even without reading about
how naturalism can be meaningful. Although we found no
evidence of moderation by educational background in Study 3,
very few participants in that study worked in scientific fields (only
15% reported working in technical or health related fields), so
even if such individuals responded differently, their responses
would be unlikely to produce a significant interaction. Thus, in
Study 5 we directly sampled natural-science students. For these
individuals, ET is not simply a theory they have learned in some
courses, it is the cornerstone of their academic life, and an
identity-defining worldview. Thus, we expected that these
participants would not reject ET in the face of existential threat,
but would instead more staunchly support the theory, given that,
like Sagan, they may view naturalism as providing human life
with meaning and purpose.
Study 5
A 2 (Behe-IDT vs. Dawkins-ET)62 (MS vs. control) mixed-
measures ANOVA revealed an interaction between the within-
subjects factor of author-theory and the between-subjects factor of
MS, F(1, 94)=4.19, p,.05, indicating that, in contrast to the
diverse samples of participants in Studies 1–4, natural-science
students trended toward greater negativity toward Behe-IDT in
response to MS, t(96)=1.76, Cohen’s d=.35, p,.05 one-tailed,
but greater positivity toward Dawkins-ET, t(94)=1.80, Cohen’s
d=.33, p,.05 one-tailed (see Figure 5). This interaction held when
we included only natural-science majors, F(1,75)=3.93, p=.05,
rather than the full sample which included majors and non-majors,
but all students who reported taking at least 2 university-level
natural science courses. The interaction also held when using the
two-item measure of views of ET/IDT only, F(1, 94)=5.17, and
interestingly, both main effects, on IDT and ET, were significant
using these scales, ts (94)=3.23 for IDT and 1.47 for ET, all
ps,.05.
Religiosity again correlated positively with Behe-IDT, and
negatively with Dawkins-ET, rs=.32 and 2.34, ps,.05. MS had
no effect on religiosity, F(1, 94)=.00, ns, and both the interaction
and simple effect on Behe-IDT held controlling for religiosity,
F(1, 92)=4.45, p,.05, and F(1, 93)=2.95, p,.05 one-tailed.
These effects also held controlling for the number of natural-
science courses taken, F(1, 93)=4.99, p,.05, and F(1, 95)=3.90,
p=.05. Neither religiosity nor number of natural-science courses
moderated the main effect of MS on Behe-IDT, bs=.02 and
2.16; both ns. These variables also did not interact with MS to
produce an effect on Dawkins-ET, bs=.17 and 2.04, both ns.
Christianity did not moderate the interaction, F(1, 81)=.01,
nor the effect of MS on Behe-IDT, F(1, 83)=0.72, both ns.
There was no Christianity6MS interaction on Dawkins-ET,
F(1, 81)=1.25, ns.
Thus, Study 5 suggests that there is at least one group of
individuals who do not embrace IDT or reject ET in response to
MS: individuals invested in natural-science research. Here,
heightened existential threat led to the opposite response from
that seen among psychology students in Studies 1 and 4, the
diverse students in Study 2, and diverse adults in Study 3. The
present responses were, however, similar to those of the
psychology students in Study 4 who learned that naturalism can
be a source of greater meaning (i.e., those in the Sagan condition).
Together, Studies 4 and 5 thus suggest that individuals who can
find greater meaning in a naturalist perspective respond to
existential threat by rejecting IDT and trending toward greater
belief in ET. Presumably, shifting these views in response to MS
allows these students to enhance symbolic immortality by
reaffirming the scientific perspective that is a major part of their
worldview and provides meaning and purpose. These findings thus
support our account of the causal process underlying the effects
found in Studies 1–3, and delineate an important boundary
condition for these effects.
Death and Science
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e17349General Discussion
The present findings demonstrate that reminders of one’s
mortality—inducing a state of mortality salience—promote
relative support for IDT, and skepticism toward ET. Individuals
respond to existential threat by becoming more accepting of a
theory that offers a greater sense of meaning by depicting human
life as having ultimate purpose (while appearing consistent with
the scientific worldview), and/or less supportive of the theory that
is the true mainstay of the scientific worldview but seems to offer
little in the way of existential comfort. These findings also suggest
that a desire to find greater meaning in human life accounts for
this effect (at least the effect of mortality salience on belief in
IDT), because it is reversed by making ET more meaningful, and
among natural-science students for whom ET is presumably
already meaningful. The findings are notable because they (a)
help explain why some people are motivated to believe in IDT
and doubt ET in terms of fundamental psychological drives; (b)
account for the underlying causal process; and (c) emerged
regardless of preexisting religious ideologies, religious affiliation,
or (with one highly limited exception, discussed below) views of
evolution. This last point suggests that although religion
influences baseline beliefs in IDT and ET, it cannot account
for the impact of MS on these views. Given previous research
suggesting that many MS effects are heightened, or occur only,
among individuals with certain preexisting belief systems or
cultural associations, the fact that we found no moderators of MS
effects—other than the extent to which naturalism is seen as
meaningful—suggests that embracing IDT or rejecting ET may
be a unique, broadly appealing mechanism that addresses the
existential concerns of religious and, for the most part, more
scientifically oriented individuals alike. In contrast, explicitly
religious ideologies tend to be fairly parochial, limiting their
appeal and making them viable defenses only for those who
already believe in a supernatural god [15].
Yet, an exception emerged in Study 5, where individuals whose
life goals require strong acceptance of ET showed the opposite
responses. Like those explicitly taught, in Study 4, to view
naturalism as a source of meaning, natural-science students
responded to MS with stronger antagonism toward IDT. This
provides converging support for the causal process found in Study
4, and suggests that rejecting IDT can be a source of existential
comfort for a limited population of individuals. These individuals
are not simply those steeped in the scientific cultural worldview—
presumably psychology undergraduates fall into that category—
but rather those who more specifically view evolution as a critical
part of their understanding of the world and a source of meaning
and purpose.
Specificity of the Effect
Although the precise direction of the effect—whether it
emerged more strongly as antagonism toward ET or support
for IDT—differed across studies, this was likely due to sampling
differences. The same pattern of results was observed in the
samples that, demographically, most resembled each other—
those in Studies 1 and 4, and Studies 2 and 3—the former of
which revealed a greater effect on Behe-IDT, and the latter on
Dawkins-ET. Study 1 and 4 participants were largely middle-to-
upper class and well-versed (if not firmly entrenched) in ET and
the scientific cultural worldview. These individuals appeared to
be largely unmovable in their views of ET, probably because the
theory has become such a mainstay of their worldview as social-
science students that, even if they would like to reject it when
confronted with existential threat, this desire is negated by a
compulsion to affirm ET as an important worldview component.
Figure 5. Effects of MS on liking of Behe and belief in IDT, and liking of Dawkins and belief in ET, in a sample of natural science
students, Study 5. Note. Values are based on standard scores; means for each scale were computed by standardizing each of the six author-theory
items that the scale comprised, around their common mean, and taking the mean of the resulting z-scores. Because the two scales were centered
around different means, values on the two scales (Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT) cannot be directly compared to each other. The overall interaction,
based on a mixed-measures ANOVA, and the main effects on Dawkins-ET and Behe-IDT, based on t-tests, were significant, ps,.05 one-tailed. Error
bars represent the standard error of the mean. *p,.05 one-tailed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017349.g005
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tudes—those related to IDT, a theory with which they are almost
certainly less familiar.
In contrast, Study 2 and 3 participants were drawn from a
broader community; most were recruited by a survey company
and either attended a wide variety of universities across North
America (Study 2) or were adults whose age and socioeconomic
status represented almost the entire spectrum of the U.S.
population (Study 3). Although these individuals are likely to be
at least nominally familiar with ET, the theory is unlikely to be
as important to their understanding of the world as it is for
psychology undergraduates. This may explain why they were
willing to espouse more negativity toward ET in order to defend
against MS. It is unclear why these individuals would not also
show stronger support for IDT in such conditions, but given
trends in that direction, it may be that rejecting ET is simply
the more powerful means of coping with existential threat, at
least for individuals who do not feel a sense of loyalty to the
theory. Regardless, it is noteworthy that while demographic
factors may influence the specific nature of this response,
they do not change whether the response occurs; as was shown
in the Study 4 follow-up, effects held controlling for stable
views of ET.
More broadly, the fact that a consistent pattern emerged across
studies, but with differences in the specific nature of the pattern
depending on sample characteristics, suggests that embracing IDT
and rejecting ET may be functionally similar in terms of regulating
the potential for existential anxiety. Indeed, in the studies where
participants completed both scales (Studies 1, 2, and 5) the two
scales were always negatively correlated, with rs ranging from
2.21 to 2.47, all ps,.05. In practice, it is not particularly
important whether individuals respond to MS by increasing
support of IDT or decreasing support of ET, because IDT
proponents tend to argue for both the merits of IDT and the
limitations of ET [40]. Nonetheless, although we strongly suspect
that differences across studies were due to sampling, further
research is needed.
Causal Process
The present research addresses critical questions about the
process underlying effects found. Thus far, studies have
demonstrated that the effects of mortality salience may be
mediated by death-thought accessibility [23] and the potential for
anxiety [41], but there is little evidence regarding the specific
motivational nature of different terror management mechanisms;
that is, few studies have directly examined why particular
worldviews assuage death-related anxiety, by testing whether
responses are moderated by the extent to which they resolve some
need or motive. Here, we expected that IDT would be more
appealing than ET because it better addresses a motivation to
find meaning and purpose in the face of existential threat;
findings from Studies 4 and 5 support this account. Although
Study 5’s natural-science student participants may have been
driven by a more general desire to embrace an already accepted
worldview or reject a theory antagonistic to it [42], the fact that
they were able to do so, given the results of the previous four
studies, suggests that they also view ET as a source of expansive
meaning. However, future studies are needed to probe the
specific causal process underlying these individuals’ responses, to
determine whether it is the same as that of the psychology
students in Study 4 who read the Sagan passage.
The results of Studies 4 and 5 also may have implications for the
process underlying other effects of mortality salience, such as
gravitation toward religious ideas [15]. They also pinpoint the
problem with ET for individuals seeking security in the face of
existential threat. ET is typically presented as the highly materialist
and utilitarian process that evolution is; as Dawkins explains,
‘‘unordered atoms… group themselves into ever more complex
patterns until they end up manufacturing people.’’ Only when
individuals are also told, ‘‘If there’s nothing in here but atoms,
does that make us less, or does that make matter more?’’—
implying that naturalism can reveal purpose in human life—do
individuals reject IDT in response to heightened MS. Future
studies are needed to examine whether manipulations along these
lines, demonstrating the potential for meaningfulness in the
natural sciences, generalize beyond psychology students who
may already be motivated to find such meaning in science.
Implications and Conclusions
These findings have implications for our understanding of how
existential concerns influence views of scientific theories and
individuals’ willingness to accept them, and for the success of the
IDT movement. No previous study has examined whether
psychological motives influence the ongoing debate between
proponents of IDT and ET—a debate of great importance to
the future of science and science education. The present research
suggests that attitudes toward scientific (or seemingly scientific)
views and ideologies can be partly shaped by unconscious
psychological motives to maintain security and ward off existential
angst through the cultivation of meaning and purpose.
In addition to providing a psychological explanation for the
popularity of IDT and antipathy toward ET, the present findings
challenge the conventional assumption that attitudes toward such
scientifically framed theories are determined solely by factors such
as logic, educational background, and ideology, though previous
research suggests that such factors clearly play a role [43–47]. This
is consistent with other recent studies on the motivational
underpinnings of social cognition, which have shown that core
insecurities regularly influence overt attitudes about ostensibly
unrelated sociopolitical issues, and that such beliefs are thus often
not objective, rationally derived constructions, but, rather,
influenced by fundamental motivations such as the need to protect
the self against psychological insecurity (e.g., existential, epistemic,
personal, or relational uncertainty; [7,48–53]). The present
research builds on and extends these previous findings by showing
that such processes generalize to attitudes and beliefs in the
scientific domain.
In sum, although religious ideology plays a large role in public
support for IDT and antagonism toward ET, these attitudes, held
by both religious and non-religious individuals, can be partly
explained by IDT’s potential for assuaging existential anxiety,
and ET’s apparent lack of an existentially compelling solution to
life’s origins.
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